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KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.—AN 












     Under U.S. copyright law, a copyright holder possesses the 
exclusive right to distribute copyrighted material to the public 
for sale or other transfer of ownership.  That exclusive right is, 
however, subject to a number of statutory exceptions.  One 
exception is the “first sale” doctrine, which not only cuts off 
the copyright holder’s ability to structure the sale and 
downstream distribution of copies of that material that were 
manufactured in the United States but also allows the owner of 
a lawfully acquired copy of that copyrighted material to resell 
it without obtaining the permission of the copyright holder.  In 
the recent case of Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
(hereinafter Wiley),1 the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to 
reconcile a number of statutory provisions in order to 
determine whether there was an extraterritorial dimension to 
the  “first sale” doctrine.  This article will examine how the 
Court’s decision in Wiley expanded the application of the “first 
sale” doctrine to include copyrighted goods that were  
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manufactured abroad rather than limiting it to copyrighted 
goods that were manufactured domestically.      
 
THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE COPYRIGHT CLAIM IN 
THE WILEY CASE  
 
     The parties involved in the Wiley case were a foreign 
student with an entrepreneurial plan and a major U.S. publisher 
of textbooks.  In 1997, Supap Kirtsaeng, a native of Thailand, 
came to the United States to earn an undergraduate degree in 
mathematics at Cornell University.  After graduating from 
college, Kirtsaeng received a fellowship to continue his 
education in the doctoral program in mathematics at the 
University of Southern California, Los Angeles.  
 
     As an undergraduate, Kirtsaeng discovered two things about 
his college textbooks.  This first was that they were very 
expensive.  The second was that the foreign editions of the 
same textbooks were a lot cheaper.  It was this second 
discovery that gave Kirtsaeng the idea to sell copies of the 
foreign editions of textbooks to U.S. students for a profit.   
Prior to executing his plan, Kirtsaeng consulted with some 
friends in Thailand and checked out copyright rules on the 
website “Googles Answers.”2  After concluding that his plan 
was viable, he asked his family and friends buy the textbooks 
in Thailand and ship them to him in California.  Kirtsaeng, 
doing business as BlueChristine99, then posted the books for 
sale at a significantly higher price on commercial websites 
such as eBay.com.   As he had anticipated, his plan proved to 
be a financial success.  His earned revenues, prior to 
reimbursing his family and friends, were reported to be 
somewhere between $900,000 and $1,200,000.3 
 
     John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (hereinafter Wiley) was the holder 
of the copyright for some of the textbooks that Kirtsaeng resold 
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on the internet.  Wiley published the textbooks targeted for its 
domestic market in the United States and John Wiley & Sons 
(Asia) Pte Ltd. (hereinafter Wiley Asia), its wholly-owned 
subsidiary, published the foreign editions of those same 
textbooks abroad.4  In most cases, the contents of the domestic 
and foreign books were either similar or identical.  The biggest 
differences were in the design, the supplemental content (U.S. 
versions typically included CD-ROMS), the type and quality of 
the materials used in the printing and binding, and the quality 
of the graphics.5   
 
     It should be noted that inside every book published by both 
Wiley and Wiley Asia was the following warning: 
  
No part of this publication may be reproduced, 
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in 
any form or by any means . . . except as 
permitted under Sections 107 or 108 of the 1976 
United States Copyright Act.6 
  
In addition, every textbook contained a specific claim for 
copyright protection.  A typical copy of an American edition of 
a Wiley textbook would read: 
 
Copyright ©2008 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.  All 
rights reserved . . . Printed in the United States 
of America.7 
 
The insert in the foreign edition of a comparable Wiley Asia 
textbook would read: 
 
Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons (Asia) 
Pte Ltd[.]  . . .  All rights reserved.  This book is 
authorized for sale in Europe, Asia, Africa and 
the Middle East only [and] may not be exported 
45 / Vol 32 / North East Journal of Legal Studies 
 
 
out of these territories.  Exportation from or 
importation of this book to another region 
without the Publisher’s authorization is illegal 
and is a violation of the Publisher’s rights.  The 
publisher may take legal action to enforce its 
rights.  . . .  Printed in Asia.8   
 
     When Wiley became aware of Kirtsaeng’s operation, it filed 
a lawsuit against him in the U.S. District Court in the Southern 
District of New York claiming federal copyright9 and 
trademark infringement10 as well as unfair competition under 
New York state law.11  Wiley’s primary claim was that 
Kirtsaeng had infringed on Wiley’s exclusive right to distribute 
copies of copyrighted works and had engaged in the 
unauthorized importation of copyright goods.  Kirtsaeng denied 
liability and asserted that his actions were protected by the 
“first sale” defense.  
      
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE “FIRST SALE” DEFENSE 
IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
   
     The “first sale” defense is based on the common law 
doctrine that restraints should not be placed on the alienation of 
chattels.  To illustrate this doctrine, Lord Coke gave an 
example of a person who possessed a horse or some other 
chattel and either gave it to a donee or sold it to a vendee on 
the condition that that party was prohibited from giving or 
selling it to anyone else.  According to Coke such a condition 
should be void since “it is against Trade and Traffic, and 
bargaining and contracting between man and man; and it . . . 
should ouster him of power given to him.”12   
    
     The “first sale” defense to copyright infringement claims 
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was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1908 case of 
Bobbs-Merrill Company v. Straus et al. d/b/a/ R.H. Macy & 
Company (hereinafter Bobbs-Merrill).13   Bobbs-Merrill, the 
publisher and copyright owner of a work of fiction, The 
Castaway, had inserted a notice in the front cover of each copy 
of the novel stating that:  “The price of this book at retail is one 
dollar net.  No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price, and a 
sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of the 
copyright.”14  Macy & Co. purchased multiple copies of the 
book from wholesale dealers with the intention of reselling 
them in its stores.  Even though Macy & Co. was aware of 
Bobbs-Merrill attempt to place limits on the retail price for the 
book, it chose to sell its copies at the retail price of eighty-nine 
cents per copy.  Bobbs-Merrill responded by filing a lawsuit in 
federal court seeking to restrain Macy & Co. from selling the 
copyrighted books.    
 
     The Supreme Court began its discussion of Bobbs-Merrill’s 
copyright claim by noting that federal copyright protection is a 
statutory right that Congress established under its Article I, § 8 
power to:  “To promote the progress of science and useful arts, 
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the 
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”   It 
therefore agreed that it would be prudent to construe the 
copyright statutes “with a view to effecting the purposes 
intended by Congress . . . [and] ought not to be unduly 
extended by judicial construction to include privileges not 
intended to be conferred, nor so narrowly construed as to 
deprive those entitled to their benefit of the rights Congress 
intended to grant.”15  While the Court acknowledged that the 
purpose of copyright law is “to secure to the author the right to 
multiply copies of his work,”16 that purpose does not result in 
limitless protection.  Section 4952 of the Revised Statutes of 
the United States (1901) specifically gave the copy holder the 
“sole liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, 
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copying, executing, finishing and vending [emphasis added] 
the same.”  But, according to the Court, that sole right to vend 
did not include the right to restrict “the subsequent alienation 
of the subject-matter of copyright after the owner had parted 
with the title to one who had acquired full dominion over it and 
had given a satisfactory price for it.”17   Absent contract 
provisions or license agreements limiting the subsequent sale 
of the copyrighted material, copyright statutes do not give 
copyright holders the right, after the sale of the book to a 
purchaser, to restrict future retail sales of the book or the right 
to specify that it may only be resold at a certain price.  The 
statutory right to vend is the right to first sell copies of the 
protected material in quantities and at a price that is 
satisfactory to the copyright holder.  It is not the right to 
control all future retail sales of those particular copies.  “The 
purchaser of a book, once sold by authority of the owner of the 
copyright, may sell it again, although he may not publish a new 
edition of it.”18 
 
     The “first sale” doctrine, which was established by the 
Court in Bobbs-Merrill, was codified in the Copyright Act of 
190919 and in the Copyright Act of 1947.20  Both versions of 
the law began by stating that the exclusive rights with regard to 
copyrighted works include the right “to print, reprint, publish, 
copy, and vend [emphasis added] the copyrighted work.”21  
Congress went on to limit those rights subject to the Bobbs-
Merrill “first sale” defense.  Section 41 of the 1909 Act stated 
that: 
 
[T]he copyright is distinct from the property in 
the material object copyrighted, and the sale or 
conveyance, by gift or otherwise, of the material 
object shall not of itself constitute a transfer of 
the copyright, nor shall the assignment of the 
copyright constitute a transfer of title to the 
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material object but nothing in this Act shall be 
deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the 
transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the 
possession of which has been lawfully 
obtained.22  [Emphasis added.] 
 
Section 27 of the 1947 Act subsequently adopted § 41 of the 
1909 Act almost verbatim.    
 
     When the Copyright Act of 197623 was enacted, it included 
a number of changes relevant to the “first sales” defense.  
Among the exclusive rights granted to the “owner of the 
copyright under this title” and enumerated in §106 was the 
right to: 
 
(3)  To distribute [emphasis added] copies or 
phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or 
by rental, lease, or lending.24 
 
The exclusive rights found in §106 were limited, however, by 
§§107 through 122.   The “first sales” doctrine was addressed 
in §109 (a)25 which specified that: 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of §106 (3), the 
owner of a particular copy or phonorecord 
lawfully made under this title, [emphasis added] 
or any person authorized by such owner, is 
entitled, without the authority of the copyright 
owner, to sell or dispose of the possession of 
that copy or phonorecord. 
 
     An additional provision of the Copyright Act specifically 
placed limitations on the importation of copyrighted materials.  
Section 602(a) provided, in part, that: 




Importation into the United States, without the 
authority of the owner of copyright under this 
title, of copies or phonorecords of a work that 
have been acquired outside of the United States 
is an infringement of the exclusive right to 
distribute the copies or phonorecords under § 
106, actionable under § 501. 
 
Section 602 then listed three instances in which the importation 
of copyrighted materials without the authority of the copyright 
holder was not an infringement of the exclusive right to 
distribute under § 106.  The exceptions included:  the 
importation of copies or phonorecords under the authority or 
for the use of the government (§ 602(a)(1)); the importation of 
not more than one copy or phonorecord for the private use of, 
but not for distribution by, the importer and the importation of 
copies and phonorecords that are part of a person’s personal 
luggage when he or she arrives from outside the U.S. (§ 
602(a)(2); and the importation by or for scholarly, educational, 
or religious organizations for archival purposes or for library 
lending purposes (§ 602(a)(1).   
 
     Section 501(a) (referred to in § 602(a)) stated, in part, that: 
 
Anyone who violates any of the exclusive 
rights of the copyright owner as provided by 
§§ 106 through 122 or of the author as 
provided in § 106A(a), or who imports copies 
of phonorecords into the United States in 
violation of § 602, is an infringer of the 
copyright or right of the author, as the case 
may be.   
 
RECENT U.S. SUPREME COURT CASE LAW  
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Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research 
International, Inc. 
     In 1998, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of Quality 
King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International, Inc. 
(hereinafter Quality King),26 addressed the question of whether 
the “first sale” defense should apply to copyrighted goods that 
had been manufactured in the United States, sold for the first 
time to a buyer in an international market, and then imported 
back to and resold in the United States.  L’anza was a 
manufacturer and seller of hair care products—all of which 
were made in the United States and affixed with copyrighted 
labels.  The L’anza products were expensive and were intended 
for a more select clientele.  Nonetheless, L’anza was concerned 
that its targeted American consumers might not be willing to 
pay the higher prices for its products if they were sold next to 
less expensive hair care products in supermarkets or drug 
stores.  Consequently, it devised a marketing plan whereby it 
would only sell its goods to U.S. distributors who limited their 
sales to authorized retailers (barber shops, beauty salons, and 
professional hair care colleges) within limited geographical 
areas.27  L’anza also spent additional capital to advertise in 
trade magazines and to offer special training sessions to its 
authorized retailers.   
 
     Although L’anza’s sales were not restricted to the domestic 
market, there are two signification differences between how the 
company operated in the United States and how it operated 
abroad.  The first difference was that L’anza spent much less 
money on advertising and promotion in the foreign markets.  
The second was that it charged its foreign distributors prices 
that were between 35% and 40% lower than it charged its 
domestic distributors.  And, it was this global price 
discrimination plan that eventually led to the lawsuit against 
Quality King.   




     In the early 1990s, L’anza’s distributor in the United 
Kingdom sold a large quantity of its products (all with 
company’s copyrighted labels) to a distributor in Malta at a 
contract price that was calculated according to the foreign price 
scheme.  The goods, all of which had been made in the United 
States and had been shipped to a foreign destination, eventually 
made their way back to United States where they were resold 
by Quality King to a number of unauthorized retailers.  L’anza 
subsequently sued Quality King as well as the Malta distributor 
and the U.S. retailers for violating its exclusive right to 
reproduce and distribute the copyrighted goods in the United 
States. 
      
     The issue in Quality King was whether L’anza, the 
copyright holder, could protect the exclusivity of its products in 
the domestic market by limiting the importation back to the 
United States of those same exact products.  The statutory 
problem was whether the copyright holder’s authority to limit 
importation under § 602(a) was similar to its exclusive right to 
distribute granted under § 106(3) and, therefore, limited by §§ 
107 through 120.  Or, more specially, whether the “first sale” 
doctrine (codified in § 109(a)) also applied to imported copies. 
The Court, in a unanimous decision delivered by Justice John 
Paul Stevens, concluded that the rights of a copyright holder 
under § 602(a) were limited to the same extent that they were 
limited under § 106(3).28  
 
     The Supreme Court found no merit in L’anza’s claim that § 
602(a) prohibited foreign distributors from reselling L’anza’s 
products to U.S. vendors who had not been able to buy them 
from L’anza’s authorized domestic distributors.  The Court 
distinguished between L’anza’s incorrect claim that § 602 
categorically prohibited the unauthorized importation of 
copyrighted goods and Quality King’s claim that, while an 
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importation might be an infringement of exclusive right to 
distribute copies under § 106(3), that right was subject to the 
limitations enumerated in §§ 107 to 120.29  In Bobbs-Merrill, 
the exclusive right “to vend” had been limited by the “first 
sale” doctrine.  Under § 106(3), the exclusive right “to 
distribute” was similarly limited by the codification of the 
“first sale” doctrine in § 109(a).  Therefore, since § 602(a) only 
applied to the unauthorized importation of goods that was an 
infringement of an exclusive right under § 106(3) and since 
that right was limited by the “first sales” doctrine found in 
§109(a), § 602(a) could not be used to prevent the domestic 
and foreign owners of the already distributed goods from 
importing and reselling them in the United States.30 
 
       L’anza had presented the Court with two statutory 
arguments.  The first was that the application of the “first sale” 
defense in the case would have rendered § 602(a) and its three 
exceptions superfluous “unless it cover[d] non-piratical 
(“lawfully made”) copies sold by the copyright holder, because 
importation nearly always implie[d] a first sale.”31   The second 
was that the § 501 definition of an “infringer” referred to two 
distinct violations—those described in §106 and those referred 
to in § 602.  The Court rejected both arguments on the grounds 
that neither adequately accounted for why § 602(a) contained 
the phrase “under § 106.”   
 
     With regards to L’anza’s first argument, the Court identified 
three instances in which the application of the “first sale” 
defense had not rendered § 602(a) superfluous. While it was 
true that the Copyright Act had explicitly prohibited the 
importation of “piratical” or unauthorized copies long before 
the enactment of § 602(a),32 that prohibition had subsequently 
been incorporated into § 602(b) of the current Act, which 
stated that:  “In the case where the making of the copies or 
phonorecords would have constituted an infringement of 
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copyright if this title had been applicable, their importation is 
prohibited.”  L’anza had argued that since § 602(b) specifically 
referred to pirated goods, § 602(a) had to apply to something 
else--nonpiratical (“lawfully made”) copies.  Although the 
Court disagreed with L’anza’s conclusion, it pointed out that 
even if § 602(a) only applied to piratical goods, it still provided 
the copyright holder with something that was quite 
significant—a private remedy against the importer that was not 
available under § 602(b).33   The Court then pointed to the fact 
that while the § 109(a) “first sale” defense could be asserted by 
the “owner” of a lawfully made copy, it was unavailable, in a § 
602(a) action, to nonowners such as bailees, licensees, 
consignees, or others whose possession of the copy was 
unlawful.  Finally, the Court noted that there was a third 
category of cases (other than those involving pirated copies of 
copies “lawfully made under this title”) that was covered by § 
602(a)  Those were cases involving copies that had been 
“lawfully made” under the copyright laws of some other 
country.34  
 
     The Court next turned to L’anza’s second argument 
involving the proper meaning of § 501 definition of an 
“infringer.” Section 501 specifically stated that an “infringer” 
was:  “Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the 
copyright owner as provided by §§ 106 through 118 or of the 
author as provided in §106A or who imports copies or 
phonorecords into the United States in violation of § 602.”  
L’anza had claimed that the § 501 references to § 106 and § 
602 were, in fact, references to two discrete violations.  
Although the Court admitted that “the use of the words “or 
who imports,” rather than words such as “including one who 
imports,” was more consistent with L’anza’s claim that a 
violation of § 602 is distinct from a violation of § 106,” it cited 
other provisions in the statute to contradict that conclusion.  
The Court compared how the prohibited importation under § 
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602(a) was unambiguously stated to be an infringement of the 
exclusive right “under § 106, actionable under § 501” while the 
infringement referred to in § 106A35 (which was also cross-
referenced with § 501), stated that it was “independent of the 
exclusive rights provided in §106.”  This suggested to the 
Court that, while §106A described an independent right, § 
602(a) violations were, in fact, more properly identified as a 
species of § 106 violations. 36   
 
     The Court found even more persuasive the fact that § 106 
rights were subject to all of the provisions of §§ 107-120 and 
not just the § 109(a) “first sale” defense.  If § 602(a) were an 
independent right, none of the limits provided for in §§ 107-
120 would be applicable.  Consequently, a foreign publisher, 
unable to assert the §107 “fair use” defense, would be liable for 
importing a newspaper to the United States if its book review 
column included excerpts from a U.S. copyrighted book.  The 
Court, citing the importance of the “fair use” defense to 
publishers of scholarly works, found it “difficult to believe that 
Congress [had] intended to impose an absolute ban on the 
importation of all such works containing any copying of 
material protected by a United States copyright.”37  Such a 
result would be counter to the fundamental purpose of the 
Copyright Act, the promotion of the “useful Arts” through the 
rewarding of creativity and the protection of original works.   
While the consequences of adopting L’anza’s construction 
would certainly aid a company in its marketing of copyrighted 
materials in different global market sectors, it would also 
“inhibit access to ideas without any countervailing benefit.”38  
 
     The Court concluded by declining to engage in a policy 
discussion over the wisdom of placing governmental restraints 
on the “gray market” and the use of “parallel importation.”39  It 
chose instead to restrict itself to interpreting the text of the 
Copyright Act that was provided by Congress.  And, the Court, 
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having completed that task, ruled in favor of Quality King 
Distributors.        
 
     It should be noted that Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg filed a 
brief concurring opinion in Quality King that anticipated the 
next “first sale” issue that would present itself to the Court.  
The sole purpose of her concurring opinion was to attempt to 
limit the Quality King holding to cases involving the “round 
trip” journey of copyrighted copies from the United States to 
locations abroad and then back to the United States.  As far as 
she was concerned, the holding did not resolve the issue for 
cases in which the alleged infringing goods had been 
manufactured abroad.  
   
Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega 
 
     In 2010, the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to a 
Ninth Circuit case40 involving allegations of copyright 
distribution and importation infringements under §§ 106(3) and 
602(a).  The issue in Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega 
(hereinafter Omega)41 was whether the holding in Quality King 
limited the use of the “first sale” defense to cases in which the 
copies of the copyrighted work had either been made or 
previously sold in the United States with the authority of the 
copyright owner. 
 
     Omega, a Swiss manufacturer of high quality watches (all 
of which were engraved on their underside with a U.S. 
copyrighted “Omega Globe Design), participated in the 
international market through a network of authorized 
distributors and retailers.  Costco Wholesale Corp. (hereinafter 
Costco), which was neither an authorized distributor nor 
retailer, purchased the copyrighted Omega watches from the 
“gray market” for resale in its discount stores.   In this 
particular case, the watches, which Omega had produced in 
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Switzerland and sold to authorized distributors overseas, were 
at some point purchased by unidentified third parties who sold 
them to ENE Limited, a New York company, who, in turn, sold 
them to Costco.  While the initial foreign sale of the watches 
had been authorized by Omega, their subsequent importation 
into the United States had not been.   Costco’s legal response to 
the Omega lawsuit was the same as Quality King’s to L’anza—
it asserted the “first sale” defense.  Both parties filed motions 
for summary judgment.  The trial court, without comment, 
ruled in favor of Costco.  When Omega appealed the case to 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the sole issue 
was whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Quality King had 
overruled the appellate court’s precedent that limited the “first 
sale” defense to copies of copyrighted materials legally made 
in the United States.  The three justice panel reversed the lower 
court decision on the grounds that the “first sale” defense was 
unavailable to the Costco. 
 
     The Court of Appeals, relying on Quality King, held that the 
copyright holder’s claims depended on the relationship 
between §§ 106(3), 109(a), and 602(a) of the Copyright Act.  
Prior to Quality King, case law in the Ninth Circuit had 
differentiated between “round trip” importation cases (in which 
the copies of the copyrighted material had been lawfully made 
in the United States, exported to an authorized foreign 
distributor, sold to unidentified third parties abroad, and 
shipped back to United States without the authorization of the 
copyright holder) and cases in which the copy of the material 
had been made abroad and subsequently imported to the United 
States without the copyright holder’s permission.  In BMG 
Music v. Perez (hereinafter BMG),42 the appellate court had 
held that §109(a) could not be used as a defense to a § 602(a) 
claim if the goods in question had been manufactured abroad 
since §109(a) only applied to goods “lawfully made under this 
title.”  And, “lawfully made under this title” “grant[ed] first 
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sale protection only to copies legally made and sold in the 
United States.”43   Parfums Givency, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, 
Inc.44 modified the holding in BMG by creating an exception 
that would allow the § 109(a) defense to be used in § 602(a) 
cases even though the copies of the copyrighted material had 
not been made in the United States so long as an authorized 
first sale had occurred in the United States.45   That exception 
was subsequently followed by the Ninth Circuit in the case of 
Denbicare U.S.A, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc.46   
 
     In Omega, the question was what impact, if any, Quality 
King would have on the Ninth Circuit’s construction of § 
109(a).  The first issue to be resolved was whether the holding 
in Quality King applied to all varieties of importation cases.  
Referring to Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion, the Court 
of Appeals held that Quality King was limited to “round trip” 
importation cases.  This conclusion was supported by the 
observation that the Supreme Court had neither discussed the 
scope of § 109(a) nor defined the meaning of “lawfully made 
under this title.”47   
 
     The next issue was whether the Ninth Circuit’s general rule 
that § 109(a) was limited to copies that had been “legally made 
in the United States” was irreconcilable with Quality King.  
The basis for the Circuit Court’s rule was its presumption that 
U.S. laws should not be applied extraterritorially unless the 
contrary is clearly indicated by statute.48  For the “first sale” 
defense to apply to copies made abroad would require the 
acknowledgment that they were “lawfully made under this 
title.”  And, that “would ascribe legality under the Copyright 
Act to conduct that occurs entirely outside of the United States, 
not withstanding the absence of a clear expression of 
congressional intent in favor of extraterritoriality.”49  The 
Circuit Court also cited the example used by the Court in 
Quality King50 whereby a U.S. copyright holder gave the 
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exclusive U.S. distribution rights to the publisher of the U.S. 
edition and the exclusive British distribution rights to the 
publisher of the British edition.  The Supreme Court had noted 
that: 
 
 [P]resumably only those [copies] made by the 
publisher in the United States edition would be 
‘lawfully made under this title’ within the 
meaning of § 109(a).   The first sale doctrine 
would not provide the publisher of the British 
edition who decided to sell in the American 
market with a defense to an action under 
§602(a). 
 
This further suggested that “lawfully made under this title” 
referred exclusively to the copies of the U.S. copyrighted 
material that had been made in the United States. 
 
     The Ninth Circuit, in Costco, concluded that its general rule 
limiting the “first sale” defense to copies of copyrighted 
materials legally made in the United States was compatible 
with Quality King and remained binding precedent.  As a 
result, the § 109(a) defense to the claims under §§ 106(3) and 
602(a) was unavailable to Costco and the lower court decision 
in favor of Costco was reversed and the case was remanded to 
the District Court. 
 
      The judgment of the Ninth Circuit was affirmed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  But, it did so by means of a per curium 
opinion, without comment, that was issued by an equally 
divided Court.   Justice Elena Kagan took no part either in the 
consideration or the decision in the case.     
 
THE APPLICATION OF THE “FIRST SALE DEFENSE” TO 
KIRTSAENG v. JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC. 




     The primary claim in the Wiley case was that Kirtsaeng had 
infringed on Wiley’s §§ 106(3) and 602(a) rights when he 
arranged to have foreign editions of textbooks send him in the 
United States and when he sold them for a profit without 
obtaining the authorization of the copyright holder.  The central 
issue was whether a §109(a) “first sales” defense was available 
to Kirtsaeng even though the textbooks had been published 
abroad and the first sale had taken place abroad. 
 
U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
 
     During the pre-trial proceedings, Kirtsaeng had submitted to 
the trial court a proposed instruction to the jury charging that 
the “first sale” doctrine could be used as a defense against a 
claim of copyright infringement.51  Judge Donald Pogue denied 
Kirtsaeng’s request and further instructed him not to raise the 
“first sale” defense during trial on the grounds that “[t]here is 
no indication that the imported books at issue here were 
manufactured pursuant to the U.S. Copyright Act . . . [and,] 
[t]o the contrary, the textbooks introduced as evidence purport, 
on their face, to have been published outside of the United 
States.”52 
 
     Pogue’s decision was based on his determination that goods 
“lawfully made under this title” applied to goods actually made 
within U.S. borders and not to goods made abroad but in a 
manner consistent with the Copyright Act.  The process by 
which Pogue arrived at that decision began with a review of the 
structure of the Act.  Unfortunately, that “[did] not provide a 
determinative conclusion.”53  He next analyzed of the 
legislative history of §§ 109 and 602—which also proved to be 
inclusive.54  His consideration of the public policy issues was 
equally frustrating—since valid arguments could be made for 
either interpretation of § 109(a).55  In the end, Pogue based his 
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decision on dicta found in Quality King.  The dicta in question 
was the Court’s statement that “§ 602(a) [would] appl[y] to a 
category of copies that are neither piratical nor “lawfully made 
under this title.”56  And, the category of not “lawfully made 
under this title” “encompassed copies that were ‘lawfully 
made’ not under the United States Copyright Act, but instead, 
under the law of some other country.”57   Since the books sold 
by Kirtsaeng had been manufactured abroad, they were not 
“lawfully made” under the Act, and “first sale” defense 
provided for in § 109(a) was inapplicable. 
 
     Prior to trial, Kirtsaeng had sought to preclude the 
introduction of evidence relating to his online “PayPal” sales 
records (including the gross revenues from his sale of the 
foreign editions of Wiley textbooks) and the profits he had 
earned on unrelated sales activities.  The trial judge granted the 
motion but only with regard to evidence of profits earned from 
books produced by other publishers (subject to a number of 
exceptions).  When the case was finally given to the jury, 
Kirtsaeng also objected to jury instructions relating to the 
assessment of statutory damages.  The jury found Kirtsaeng 
liable for willful infringement of the Copyright Act and 
imposed damages of $75,000 for each of the eight Wiley books 
in question.58  Kirtsaeng appealed the case to the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit.   
 
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 
 
     The principal question on appeal (which was one of first 
impression for the Second Circuit) was whether the “first sale” 
doctrine could be asserted as a defense in an action alleging a 
copyright infringement for copies of copyrighted materials that 
had been manufactured abroad.  The key concern was whether 
those materials had been “lawfully made under this title.”  The 
Court of Appeals, in a 2-1 decision delivered by Justice José 
61 / Vol 32 / North East Journal of Legal Studies 
 
 
Cabranes, affirmed the lower court’s ruling and held that the 
§109(a) defense was inapplicable. 
 
     The appellate court’s de nova review of the case began with 
an acknowledgement that there was “some tension” between 
the broad control that § 602(a)(1) gave to the copyright holder 
with regard to the direct or indirect importation into the United 
States of the copies of the copyrighted goods and the § 109(a) 
limits placed on the copyright holder with regard to the 
distribution of those goods after their initial sale.59  Even 
though the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in Quality 
King had held that § 109(a) limited the copyright holder’s 
rights under §602(a), the Second Circuit was hesitant to apply 
that ruling to Wiley.  The reason for that hesitation was based 
on a key difference between the two cases—the fact that while 
the goods in Quality King had been manufactured in the United 
States, the goods in Wiley had been manufactured abroad.  The 
Court of Appeals cited Ginsburg’s concurring opinion in 
Quality King (which attempted to limit the Court’s holding to 
“round trip” journeys) and Steven’s “instructive dicta” (which 
suggested that § 602(a) “encompasses copies that may not be 
subject to the first sale doctrine—e.g., copies that are lawfully 
made under the law of another country”)60 as well as Steven’s 
hypothetical description of the limits on the exclusive rights of 
an American publisher and distributor of an American edition 
of a book and a British publisher and  distributor of a British 
edition of the same book).61  These references seemed to 
suggest that the Supreme Court had concluded that copyrighted 
material manufactured abroad were not subject to the “first 
sale” defense.  But, such a suggestion was mudded by the 
Supreme Court’s failure to transform the dicta in Quality King 
into a compatible holding in Omega.       
 
     In order to clarify the meaning of the phrase “lawfully made 
under this title,” the appellate court focused on the text of § 
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109(a) and the structure of the Copyright Act.  Understanding 
the text of § 109(a) turned out to be problematic given the fact 
that the word “made” was not a term of art under the Copyright 
Act62 and the word “under” was something of a “chameleon” 
that the courts have only understand by “draw[ing] on its 
meaning from its context.”63  Attempts to understand the words 
in the context of the Act were equally frustrating.  If the phrase 
“lawfully made under this title” was interpreted to mean 
“lawfully made in the United States,” it would be compatible 
with the general presumption that statutes do not apply 
extraterritorially.  (Such a presumption had, in fact, been 
adopted in previous Second Circuit copyright cases.)64  But, 
such an interpretation would also ignore the fact that the 
Copyright Act also explicitly took into account activities 
occurring abroad.65  After considering a number of alternative 
possibilities, the majority opinion concluded that the “relevant 
text [was] simply unclear” and, in fact, the phrase ““lawfully 
made under this title” could plausibly be interpreted to mean 
any number of things, including:  (1) “manufactured in the 
United States,” (2)  “any work made that is subject to the 
protection of this title,” or (3) “lawfully made under this title 
had this title been applicable.””66 
 
     Since the appellate court found the text of § 109(a) to be 
“utterly ambiguous,” it decided “to adopt an interpretation of § 
109(a) that best comport[ed] with both § 602(a) and the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Quality King.”67  Two assumptions 
concerning § 602(a) convinced the majority to deny the “first 
sale” defense to cases involving copies of copyrighted works 
made abroad.  The first was the assumption that § 602(a) was 
intended to give copyright holders some degree of flexibility in 
how they divided and treated their international and domestic 
markets for the same copyrighted work.  Such an intention led 
to the conclusion that the “first sale” defense should be limited 
to copies “lawfully made in the United States” so that 
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copyright holders, in most instances,68 could control the 
circumstances in which foreign made copies could be legally 
imported into the United States.   The second assumption was 
that § 602(a) would be irrelevant in the vast majority of cases if 
the “first sale” defense was allowed to apply to every copy 
manufactured abroad that were either made “subject to 
protection under Title 17,” or “consistent with the requirements 
of Title 17 had Title 17 been applicable.”  Consequently, it had 
to be read in such a way as to limit the “first sale” defense to 
works manufactured in the United States. 
 
     The Second Circuit Court dismissed the Supreme Court’s 
affirmation of the contradictory holding in Omega and focused 
instead on “what the Justices appear to have had in mind when 
deciding Quality King.”69  It followed the District Court’s lead 
and relied on the dicta that found the scope of § 602(a) to be 
broader than § 109(a)—at least in so far as it “applie[d] to a 
category of copies that [we]re neither piratical nor “lawfully 
made under this title” [and] [t]hat category encompassed copies 
that were ‘lawfully made’ not under the United States 
Copyright Act, but instead, under the law of some other 
country.”70  The appellate court concluded that since, “in the 
[Supreme] Court’s view, copies “lawfully made” under the 
laws of a foreign country—though perhaps not produced in 
violation of any United States laws—are not necessarily 
“lawfully made” insofar as that phrase is used in § 109(a) of 
our Copyright Act,”71 the District Court was correct when it 
decided that Kirtsaeng could not assert a “first sale” defense.72 
 
U.S. SUPREME COURT 
 Majority Opinion 
 
     The U.S. Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Kirtsaeng v. 
Wiley & Sons, Inc., unequivocally extended the “first sale” 
defense to the owners of copies of copyrighted goods that had 
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been manufactured abroad.  Justice Stephen Breyer delivered 
the opinion for the majority of the Court that included Chief 
Justice John Roberts and Justices Clarence Thomas, Samuel 
Alito, Sonya Sotomayer, and Elena Kagan. Justice Kagan filed 
a separate concurring opinion, in which Justice Alito joined.  
The dissenting opinion, filed by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
was joined by Justices Anthony Kennedy and by Justice 
Antonin Scalia (except for Parts III and V-B-1). 
 
     The Court granted a writ of certiorari in the Wiley case, in 
part, to resolve the different ways that the U.S. Circuit Courts 
had handled the issue of whether the “first sale” defense 
applied to copyrighted works manufactured abroad.  The 
Second and Ninth Circuits had taken the view that the phrase in 
§109(3) referring to copies “lawfully made under this title” 
created a geographical limit on the scope of the “first sale” 
defense.  The geographical limit recognized by the Second 
Circuit only subjected copies “made in territories in which the 
Copyright Act is law” [emphasis added)73 to the “first sale” 
defense.  The Second Circuit concluded that the “first sale” 
defense could apply to copies that had been “manufactured 
domestically” but not to copies manufactured “outside of the 
United States.”  The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, extended 
its geographically limited application of the “first sale” defense 
to cases involving copies that had been lawfully made in the 
United States as well as copies that had been lawfully made 
outside the United but had been initially sold in the United 
States with the copyright owner’s permission.74  Both the 
Second and Ninth Circuits’ geographical interpretations 
precluded Kirtsaeng from successfully asserting a “first sale” 
defense with regard to the Wiley (Asia) books.  Even though 
the U.S. copyright holder had given permission to Wiley (Asia) 
to make the copies abroad, the copyright holder had never 
given anyone who bought copies of those books permission to 
resell them.  And, that was the result regardless of whether the 
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copy had been purchased at a retail store, over the internet, or 
at a library sale.75  
 
     The Third Circuit had rejected a geographical approach on 
the grounds that limiting the “first sale” doctrine only to copies 
made within the United States “d[id] not fit comfortably within 
the scheme of the Copyright Act.”76  It preferred an 
interpretation of the words “lawfully made under this title” to 
mean made “in accordance with” or “in compliance with” the 
Copyright Act.  Under this non-geographical approach, the 
“first sale” defense could apply to copyrighted materials that 
had been made abroad according to the requirements of 
American copyright law and with the authorization of the 
copyright holder.77    
 
     In order to evaluate the different approaches taken by the 
Circuit Courts, the Supreme Court focused on the language of 
§109(a) and its context within the Copyright Act, the common 
law history of the “first sale” defense, and the practical 
consequences of adopting the conflicting interpretations.  The 
Supreme Court’s linguistic analysis favored a nongeographical 
interpretation of “lawfully made under this title.”  That meant 
that it extended to copies that had been made “in accordance 
with” or “in compliance with” the Copyright Act.   The Court 
was impressed by the fact that a literal reading gave each word 
in the five-word phrase a distinct purpose.  “Lawfully made” 
copies were distinguished from copies that were unlawfully 
made.  Since the dictionary meaning of the word “under” can 
mean “in accordance with,78 “under this title” could be easily 
be read to mean “in accordance” with a particular standard of 
lawfulness (i.e. the Copyright Act).    For the majority, the 
nongeographical interpretation was simple, promoted a 
traditional copyright objective (the combating of piracy), and 
made word-by-word linguistic sense.79  
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     In comparison, the Court found the geographical 
interpretation favored by Wiley to be linguistically wanting.  In 
order for the geographical interpretation to work, the emphasis 
in the phrase “lawfully made under this title” would have had 
to be placed on the word “under.”  The suggestion that “under 
this title” meant “in conformance with the Copyright Act 
where the Copyright Act is applicable” would not work unless 
the reader was also able to show that the Act was “applicable 
only in the United States.”80  And, that was a serious obstacle 
for Wiley to overcome—especially since nothing in the phrase 
“under this title” (including the word “under”) could be 
interpreted to mean “where.”81   
 
     An additional, and more serious, problem with the 
geographical interpretation arose when an attempt was made to 
read the geographical limitation into the word “applicable” (or 
the equivalent).  The Court, by way of example, suggested that 
just because the Act did not instantly protect an American 
copyright holder from unauthorized piracy occurring abroad 
did not make the Act inapplicable to copies made abroad.  
Foreign-printed pirated works were clearly subject to the Act 
under § 602(a)(2), which states that: 
 
Importation into the United States or exportation 
from the United States, without the authority of 
the owner of the copyright under this title, of 
copies or phonorecords, the making of which 
either constituted an infringement of copyright, 
or which would have constituted an 
infringement of copyright if this title had been 
applicable, is an infringement of the exclusive 
right to distribute copies or phonorecords under 
§§ 501 and 506 (emphasis added). 
 
The Court also referred to § 104(a), in which works “subject to 
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protection under this title” included unpublished works 
“without regard to the nationality or of the author,” and to 
§104(b), in which protection also was provided for works “first 
published” in any one of the nearly 180 nations that are parties 
to a copyright treaty with the United States.82  
 
     Finally, the Supreme Court found the Ninth Circuit’s 
extension of its geographical interpretation (to include copies 
manufactured abroad but first sold in the United States with the 
American copyholder’s permission) to be linguistically 
disingenuous.  There was simply no way to interpret “lawfully 
made under this title” to be half-geographical and half-
nongeographical.  If the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation 
prevailed, a publisher, which printed its books abroad and 
authorized their importation and sale in the United States, 
could prohibit students from reselling the textbooks back to a 
campus bookstore at the end of the semester.  And, that was an 
unacceptable consequence and a misreading of “lawfully made 
under this title.” 
 
     The Court next reviewed the “first sale” defense from both a 
historical and contemporary statutory context—and concluded 
that Congress was concerned about something other than 
geographical limits when it enacted the present version of § 
109(a).  The “first sale” defense, which was initially 
established as a statutory defense in the Copyright Act of 
1909,83 stated that:  “[N]othing in this Act shall be deemed to 
forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a 
copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully 
obtained” [emphasis added].  Since there was no reference to 
geography in the original “first sale” provision, the Court was 
interested in determining whether the text of the current 
statutory provision, which applies to those who are “owners” of 
a copy of a copyrighted work that was “lawfully made under 
this title,” was altered to address geographical concerns.  The 
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Court noted that the difference in the two statutory provisions 
was not based on any concern for geographical limitations but 
rather on a concern to limit who was eligible to assert the “first 
sale” limitation.  In the 1909 Act, the right belonged to 
whoever lawfully possessed the copy—which meant that it 
might be claimed by bailees and lessees (such as owners of 
movie theaters who had leased copyrighted films from movie 
distributors or filmmakers) as well as actual owners.  Since 
Congress was not satisfied with that result, it changed the 
wording of the current Act to restrict the defense to the 
“owners” of copies “lawfully made under the title.”  The 
legislative history leading up to the revisions in the current Act 
seems to support the conclusion that it was a “who” rather than 
a “where” issue that precipitated the statutory language.84 
 
     Another relevant change in the current Act (which phased 
out the “manufacturing clause”) reflected a concern that 
materials manufactured abroad and materials manufactured in 
the United States should be accorded “equal treatment.”85  A 
geographical interpretation of the “first sale” defense would 
frustrate the purpose of the “equal treatment” principle since it 
would give the holder of a U.S. copyright (who might be a 
foreign national) the right to permanently control the U.S. 
distribution chain (including sales, resales, and gifts) for copies 
of the materials that were printed abroad--but not for copies 
printed in the United States.86  
 
     The final contextual argument raised by the Court related to 
the normal presumption that words lawfully made under the 
same title should carry the same meaning when they occur in 
different (but related) sections.  Sections 109(c), 109(e), 
110(1), and 106 of the Copyright Act all contain the phrase 
“lawfully made under this title.”87  The Court found 
unacceptable the suggestion that it adopt a nongeographical 
reading of the phrase in the first three cases and a geographical 
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reading only for the provision relating to the “first sale” 
defense.  Such a result would be inconsistent and contrary to 
the result that Congress had intended. 
 
     One of the reasons that the Court reviewed the common law 
background of the “first sale” defense was to see if the 
presumption, that when Congress passes legislation in an area 
that was previously governed by common law, it does so with 
the intention of retaining the substance of the common law, 
held in this case.88  The common law basis for the “first sale” 
defense was the rule that restraints should not be placed on the 
alienation of chattels.  Lord Coke’s articulation of that rule in 
the early 17th century emphasized the importance of enabling 
buyers to freely dispose of property that they had previously 
acquired.89  That same common law rule was used by the 
Supreme Court, in the case of Bobbs-Merrill,90 to create the 
“first sale” defense for copyrighted materials.  Congress 
subsequently codified that defense (the predecessor of § 
109(a)) in the Copyright Act of 1909.  After reviewing Coke’s 
common law rule, the Court’s precedent in Bobbs-Merrill, and 
the codification of that precedent in the 1909 Act, the Court 
was unable to identify any geographical distinctions that would 
preclude the “straight forward” application of the  Bobbs-
Merrill “first sale” defense to authorized copies made abroad.91 
 
     The Court, in a pragmatic turn, next considered the impact 
that a geographical interpretation would have on a basic 
constitutional copyright objective—“To promote the Progress 
of Science and useful Arts” (U.S. Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 
8).  Libraries would have to get permission from the copyright 
holders of books published abroad and obtained by the library 
before they could circulate or otherwise distribute them.92  A 
large portion of the used book business would be in jeopardy.93  
American purchasers of technology dependent items (such as 
cars, microwaves, calculators, mobile phones, and computers) 
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that had been made abroad and that contained one or more 
copyrighted software programs or packaging, would not be 
able to resell those items without obtaining the permission of 
the holders of each copyrighted component.94  Retailers would 
face the uncertainty of copyright infringement suits for the 
many copyrighted items that were manufactured abroad and 
purchased by the retailers for the purpose of resell in their 
stores.95  And, museum directors would face the prospect of 
having to obtain the permission of the copyright owners of 
foreign produced art (which may have already been sold or 
donated to a foreign museum by the copyright holder) before 
they could display that art in the United States.96  While Wiley 
and the dissenting opinion dismissed these “horribles” as 
“artificial inventions,” the majority of the Court was less 
sanguine and concluded that “the practical problems . . . 
described are too serious, too extensive, and too likely to come 
about for us to dismiss them as insignificant—particularly in 
the light of the ever-growing importance of foreign trade to 
America.”97           
 
     The majority opinion concluded by addressing four 
arguments raised in the dissenting opinion.  The first was 
whether the Court’s unanimous decision in Quality King 
supported a geographical interpretation.  Under Quality King, 
the Court had ruled that the Copyright Act’s “importation 
provision” (now § 602(a)(1) and then § 602(a)) did not bar the 
owner of copies of American made copyrighted materials 
purchased abroad from importing those materials back into the 
United States if the U.S. copyright holder had authorized the 
first sale and original exportation of the goods but had not 
authorized the return importation.  Just as the copyright 
holder’s exclusive right to distribute the goods under § 106 was 
subject to the § 109(a) “first sale” defense so to was the 
copyright holder’s right to limit the importation of previously 
sold copies of those goods under the “importation provision.”  
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The dissent had argued that if § 602(a)(1) did not apply to 
pirated goods or to owners of lawfully made copies, it would in 
fact be superfluous.  The majority countered that (without 
permission, and subject to the exceptions in § 602(a)(3)), the 
“importation provision” would still prohibit the importing of 
copies that were lawfully made abroad where “(1) a foreign 
publisher operating as the licensee of an American publisher 
prints copies of a book overseas but, prior to any authorized 
sale, seeks to send them to the United States; (2) a foreign 
printer or other manufacturer (if not the “owner” for purposes 
of § 109(a), e.g. before an authorized sale) sought to send 
copyrighted goods to the United States ; (3) a book publisher 
transports copies to a wholesaler” and the wholesaler (not yet 
the owner) sends them to the United States, . . . or (4)  a foreign 
film distributer, having leased films for distribution, or any 
other licensee, consignee, or bailee sought to send to the United 
States.”98 
     The Court also rejected the suggestion that the example, in 
Quality Court, of the copyright holder who gave the exclusive 
American distributions rights to a publisher in the United 
States and the exclusive British distribution rights to a 
publisher in England was controlling in this case.  That 
example had concluded with the statement that “presumably 
only those [copies] made by the publisher of the United States 
edition would be ‘lawfully made under the title’ within the 
meaning of § 109(a).”99  Wiley had argued that that statement 
supported its geographical interpretation of the current § 
602(a)(1) (previously § 602(a)) since it meant that even books 
published abroad under a valid license did not qualify as works 
“lawfully made under this title.”  The majority dismissed the 
Quality Court statement as “pure dictum” and as “unnecessary 
dictum” that was contained in a rebuttal to a counterargument.  
The meaning of “lawfully made under this title” was neither an 
issue in Quality King nor an issue that had been fully argued.   
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Since the Court’s consideration of the issue in the current case 
had demonstrated that the dicta was, in fact, incorrect, it is not 
bound by that dicta.100   
 
     The Court next addressed the dissent’s assertion that the 
legislative history supported its geographical interpretation of § 
109(a). The historical events to which the minority referred 
occurred over a decade before the enactment of the 1979 Act 
and reflected the concerns of that the representatives of the 
book, record, and film industries had made to the Registrar of 
Copyrights regarding the difficulty of dividing international 
markets.  The Registrar of Copyrights had responded to those 
concerns by proposing two draft provisions.  A report prepared 
by the Copyright Office had explained that the second draft 
provision would have made the importing of a copy without the 
permission of the copyright holder a violation of the exclusive 
right of the copyright holder where the copyright holder had 
authorized the making of copies in the foreign country for 
distribution only in that country.   The Court found that it could 
better ascertain the meaning of § 109(a) (as it was enacted in 
the 1979 Act) by placing greater weight on the congressional 
report accompanying § 109(a) (which was written in 1975)101 
rather than on the remarks of industry representatives 
concerning § 602 (which were made in 1964).102  The 
congressional report (referred to by the majority) reiterated the 
importance of the “first sale” doctrine and explained the 
nongeographical purposed for the words “lawfully under this 
title.”103       
 
     The Court conceded the validity of the third claim raised by 
the dissent—that a nongeographical interpretation of § 109(a) 
would seriously disrupt attempts by publishers and copyright 
holders to divide foreign and domestic markets.  But, that was 
not seen to be a problem since there is no basic principle of 
copyright law that would suggest that publishers were entitled 
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to the right to charge different prices for the same book in 
different geographical markets.  Art. I, §8, cl. 8 of the U.S. 
Constitution gave Congress the power to “secur[e]” to 
“authors” for “limited [t]imes” the “exclusive [r]ight to their . . 
. [w]ritings.”  While the Founders conceived of that as a 
limited right to exclude competition, there is nothing to suggest 
that they thought it included “a right to divide markets or a 
concomitant right to charge different purchasers different 
prices for the same book, say to increase or maximize gain.”104  
The inclusion of the “first sale” defense in copyright law 
placed limits on a copyright holder’s ability to divide domestic 
markets.  In reading the Copyright Act, the Court could find 
nothing to indicate that Congress believed that copyright 
owners should have more power to divide international 
markets.105        
              
     The final issue raised by the dissent was its concern that the 
Court’s decision in Wiley would launch United States copyright 
law into an unprecedented regime of “international 
exhaustion”—which the United States opposed.106   This latter 
claim was neither made by the Solicitor General in the amicus 
brief nor in oral arguments.  In fact, when pressed, the Solicitor 
General had admitted in oral argument that reading the 
Copyright Act to allow the copyright holder to retain perpetual 
downstream control was worse than the restriction of market 




     Justice Elena Kagan filed a concurring opinion that was 
joined by Justice Samuel Alito.  While she fully agreed with 
the Court’s opinion, she thought it was necessary to point out 
the way Congress could address the problems that might 
inevitably result from reading the Wiley decision in conjunction 
with Quality King.   When read together the two decisions 
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“constrict the scope of § 602(a)(1)’s ban on unauthorized 
importation.”108  But that was only the case because Quality 
King did not apply the importation ban to copies receiving 
first-sale protection under § 109(a).  To read the ruling in Wiley 
(that copies “lawfully made under this title” extend to 
copyright copies made abroad) with the ruling in Quality King 
would, in fact, diminish of the scope of § 602(a)(1) “to a fairly 
esoteric set of applications.”109   But, if such a result was 
unacceptable to Congress, then Congress should “recognize 
Quality King—and not [Wiley]—as the culprit.”110  Congress 
might have been concerned with market segmentation when it 
enacted § 602(a)(1).  It might have intended copyright owners 
to be able to divide the market in the very way Wiley sought.  
But, it was also likely that Congress had not intended to 
remove first-sale protection from every copy manufactured 
abroad.  The more likely objective was to allow the copyright 
holder to continue to control the import of those goods even 
when the first-sale doctrine applied.  Kagan rejected the 
dissenting justices “misconstrued” interpretation of §109(a)—
which was meant “to restore §602(a)(1) to its purposely 
rightful function of enabling copyright holders to segment 
international markets.”111  At the same time, she suggested that 
if Congress wanted copyright owners to have a greater ability 
to restrict importation and to divide markets, it should address 




     The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg and joined by Justice Anthony Kennedy, and (in part) 
by Justice Antonin Scalia, found the majority’s interpretation 
of the Copyright Act to be “at odds with Congress’ aim to 
protect owners against the unauthorized importation of low-
priced, foreign-made copies of their copyrighted works.”112   In 
order to determine whether the unauthorized importation of 
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foreign-made copies was a copyright infringement under U.S. 
law, Ginsburg focused on the § 602(a)(1) importation ban and 
its interpretation in Quality King.  In that instance, the Court 
had refused to apply the § 602(a)(1) ban to the round trip 
importation back to the United States of copyrighted materials 
that had been made in the United States and subsequently sold 
abroad.  That was because the § 602(a)(1) ban only applied to 
materials had been “lawfully made” under the laws of some 
country other than the United States.   Ginsburg argued that 
since the books imported by Kirtsaeng had not been “lawfully 
made” in the United States, the “first sale” doctrine under § 
109(a) did not apply113 and “the unauthorized importation 
constitute[d] copyright infringement under § 602(a)(1).”114   
 
     Ginsburg pointed to the text of the Copyright Act to show a 
strong Congressional intent to provide copyright holders “with 
a potent remedy against the importation of foreign-made copies 
of their copyrighted works.”115  One way for that 
Congressional intent to be realized would be to limit the 
application of the “lawfully made under this title” phrase in 
§109(a) to those instances in which the materials in question 
were governed by and conducted in compliance with the U.S. 
Copyright Act.  Since the Court had already held that the 
Copyright Act d[id] not apply extraterritorially, Wiley’s 
printing of the textbooks abroad was neither governed by the 
Copyright Act and nor “lawfully made under [the Act].”116 
 
     The dissenting opinion’s exegesis of the phrase, “lawfully 
made under this title,” questioned the majority’s understanding 
of the term “under” and argued that it should have been 
interpreted it to mean the “signal[ing] of a relationship of 
subjection, where one thing is governed or regulated by 
another.”117  Ginsburg observed that “only by disregarding this 
established meaning of “under” c[ould] the Court arrive at the 
conclusion that Wiley’s foreign- manufactured textbooks were 
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“lawfully made under” U.S. copyright law, even though the 
law did not govern their creation.”118                
 
     The dissent then undertook a review the legislative history 
of §602(a)(1) (which Scalia did not join).  The review focused 
on the role of the U.S. Copyright Office in the lengthy revision 
effort that culminated in the enactment of the Copyright Act of 
1976.   The dissent took exception with the majority’s view 
that the legislative history was “inconclusive.”  It claimed 
instead that the history confirmed what the “plain text” of the 
Act conveyed . . . that the intention of § 602(a)(1) was to 
“provide copyright owners with a remedy against the 
unauthorized importation of foreign-made copies of their 
works, even if those copies were made and sold abroad with 
the copyright owner’s authorization.”119          
 
     Another concern raised by Ginsburg was the inconsistency 
between the majority’s decision and the position that the 
United States has taken with regard to the international trade 
issue of national versus international exhaustions of protection 
for intellectual property.120  While the minority acknowledged 
that there was no international consensus on the issue of 
“whether the sale in one country of a good incorporating 
protected intellectual property exhausts the intellectual 
property owner’s right to control the distribution of the good 
elsewhere,”121 it noted that the United States had rejected the 
international exhaustion rule and taken the position that 
domestic copyright owners should be able to prevent the 
unauthorized copies of their work sold abroad.122  The minority 
was concerned that the majority’s ruling in favor of an 
international-exhaustion rule (that benefits U.S. consumers but 
could disadvantage foreign holders of U.S. copyrights) “risks 
undermining the United States’ credibility on the world 
stage.”123     
     The dissenting opinion concluded with a discussion of the 
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“parade of horribles” that the majority feared would occur if 
the Court had not applied the “first sale” defense in this case.  
Libraries would not be closed, used-book dealers would not be 
put out of business, art museums would not be crippled, and 
the resale of a wide range of consumer goods would not be 
prevented.  While the occurrence of those kinds of events 
would be horrible, Ginsburg suggested that existing copyright 
laws and precedents would prevent those events from actually 




     Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc was very much about 
the competing interests of copyright holders and the owners of 
copies of copyrighted materials.  But, it was about those 
competing interests in a world of increasingly borderless 
markets.  The first time purchasers of the copies of copyrighted 
material may be individual consumers, small-time 
entrepreneurs, big box stores, or on-line shopping networks.  In 
Quality King, those purchasers were allowed to use the “first 
sale” defense against copyright holders who produced their 
copies in the United States and shipped them abroad with the 
expectation that those copies would not return to compete in 
the domestic market without the copyright holder’s 
authorization.  After Quality King, many copyright holders 
thought that the solution might be to manufacture and sell the 
copies of their copyrighted materials abroad with the 
expectation that those copies would be prevented from being 
imported to the United States under § 602(a)(1).  But, that 
solution has proved to be disappointing since the Court’s Wiley 
decision made the “first sale” defense applicable to those 
situations. There is now no doubt that Wiley will facilitate the 
gray market importing of goods outside of the distribution 
channel that the copyright holders had envisioned and 
negotiated.  Wiley Asia was unsuccessful in its attempts to 
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keep Kirtsaeng and his cohorts from acquiring the less 
expensive foreign copies of its textbooks, shipping them to the 
United States, and placing them in direct competition with the 
more expensive editions published by Wiley.  Entrepreneurs 
such as Kirtsaeng and big box stores like Costco were certainly 
the “winners” under the current ruling.125 But, the Court was 
also concerned about the other group of winners who would 
continue to profit from the Congress’ promotion of the 
progress of science and the useful arts after the Court’s current 
ruling.  Those winners included libraries and their patrons, 
used-book dealers and their customers, technology companies 
and the consumers of their cars, microwaves, mobile phones, 
and personal computers, art museums and their visitors, as well 
as retail stores and their purchasers of foreign goods.  
Unfortunately, the losers in this case were not limited to the 
copyright holders--but also to consumers in developing 
markets who may no longer be offered lower prices for goods 
that sell for much more in the United States.  
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